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“Recollection, Retribution, and Restoration:
American Civil War Prison Policy in
Union and Confederate Prisoner-of-War Memory.”

Over a hundred and thirty eight years have passed since Robert E. Lee’s
surrender at Appomattox Court House and yet the Civil War continues to live in
American historiography.

Despite David Herbert Donald’s announcement in the

early 1960s that Civil War history was dead, historians have continued the
campaign.

Over the past four decades historians have advanced the standard of

research on several historiographic fronts: gender and race issues, sectional
party allegiances, the economy and home front in the Union and the Confederacy,
military leadership, strategy, and tactics, foreign diplomacy, and the impact of
industry and technology on soldiers and society.

From all of the aforementioned,

there emerges and increasingly clearer portrait of the people, places, and
episodic events that form the very bedrock of contemporary fascination with the
war.

Yet despite all of the innovation and erudition, historians have written

little on an equally important and highly contentious subject: the Civil War
prisoner-of-war system.

It was a system that claimed the lives of thousands of

men and forever changed the political and ideological perception of those who
survived to tell about it. 1
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Because former as well as recently emerging literature on the American Civil
War prison system has bent toward specific case studies of individual camps and
conditions, the objective of this study includes the institutional perspective of
prison policy in order to form a combined recollection of the system.

By

combining the soldier’s perspective with that of the policy-makers, a more
transparent image emerges and enables us to better differentiate myth from
reality.

Results indicate that late-war camp conditions were more of a byproduct

of inconsistent early war policy directives, including friction between central
and state governments, and less the result of inadequate care or intentional
mistreatment as maintained by some veterans, preachers, and politicians. 2
Because United States foreign policy was predicated upon neutralizing any
foreign belligerent or de facto recognition of the South, the Lincoln
administration logically avoided any cartel or exchange agreement, an act that
would have been a form of belligerent recognition in and of itself.

The North

only acceded to a conditional exchange policy after Southern de facto recognition
was achieved, because of the blockade, and whenever a majority of prisoners were
held by the South.

Political expediency, therefore, dictated prison policy.

With the question of de facto recognition remaining at an impasse well into
the first year of the war, neither the United States nor Confederate governments
developed an effective means for dealing with prisoners-of-war in any form of
proactive manner.

The governmental policy delays, therefore, caused logistical
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problems for both sides: who should pay for it in the North, and how to pay for
it in the South.

Logistical concerns, coupled by an ever-changing geographical

and geopolitical landscape, caused further policy delays.

Because of the delays

both governments were accused, at home and across the battle lines, of
premeditated mistreatment.

The perception on the part of the prisoners with

respect to their governments’ apparent lack of empathy, then, is what exacerbated
much of the pejorative post-war rhetoric and recrimination; rhetoric and
recrimination utilized for political, and at times, personal gain both inside and
outside the federal and state legislative assemblies. 3
The apparent lack of governmental empathy is best illustrated in the
prisoner’s shared belief that they were held in captivity, without hope of
exchange, in order to reduce their ranks by disease.

Yet despite the personal

reproaches of the prisoners, wartime policy, rather than an intentional
withholding of supplies, led to their demise.

Ulysses S. Grant reluctantly

affirmed the priority of military policy—one of necessity—when he said, “It is
hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity
to those left in our ranks to fight our battles.” 4

Irrespective of Grant’s words

or the reality of military and political decision-making, the prisoner’s personal
accounts, shaped largely by what they actually believed to be true, would have a
lasting and motivating impact, and thus would serve as harbingers for all
subsequent sectional polemics. In short, this paper argues that the lack of
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consistent prison policies, most a byproduct of the changing goals and the
unexpected duration of the war, in Washington (and to a lesser degree in
Richmond), as well as interference by state governments, created the misery of
the emaciated.

The memories of the emaciated, then, impacted postwar rhetoric

and retarded reunion. 5

For years before and after Robert E. Lee moved his army toward Appomattox Court
House, the general public and politicians in both sections tirelessly rekindled
the recriminatory rhetoric that would come to surround the prisoner-of-war
system.

Union and Confederate soldiers, politicians, and veterans used the

system’s ghastly aura--for personal and political reasons--to strengthen and
sustain sectional animosity.

Whether for monetary or political gain, veterans,

aided by some legislators eager to raise their own political capital, often
embellished accounts of their imprisonment on pension applications.

Politicians

too would wave the bloody shirt with their incendiary rhetoric regarding the
treatment of their captured citizens, soldiers, and sailors in order to solidify
home-front support during the war, and to exacerbate political animosity after
the war. 6
In a 1916 speech Bennett H. Young, a former Confederate prisoner of war at
Camp Chase in Ohio, ably illuminated that which had aided the false consciousness
of the public regarding recriminatory and sectional party rhetoric.

He said that

“much of the bitterness between the North and the South during and since the war
grew out of the treatment of prisoners.. . . It suited the purposes of the
‘bloody shirt’ element to exaggerate every possible circumstance in order to
embitter the people of the North against the people of the South . . . [so as to

5
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give] the party then in power lengthened control of the government.” 7

Young

therefore, maintained that some politicians were willing to manipulate sources-bend ethical principle--in order to meet political practicality.
From the three-score years that preceded Bennett’s comments, there emerged a
literary effusion of articles, expositions, and anecdotes about prisons.
Veterans from the North and South were uniformly convinced “that their jailors
had subjected them to treatment heinously designed to reduce their ranks by
starvation and disease.” 8

Moreover, ex-prisoners called into question, some in

published form, the leaders and policies that had created and protracted their
time in the valley of the shadow.

Thus despite what Bennett held to be true in

the twentieth century, few veterans believed to be true in the immediate postwar
period of the nineteenth century.
The first published accounts of prison life in the South appeared in the
late summer of 1862 following the exchange agreement between opposing
governments.

The initial accounts were written to incite a public outcry against

the inhumane treatment of soldiers by southern “barbarians.”

Yet because the

very nature of an uninterrupted exchange reduced the overall time that
individuals were held in captivity, the original published accounts failed to
produce much response, humanitarian or otherwise, in the North. 9
When autumn approached a year later in 1863, however, Union policy regarding
the cartel changed, and the exchange was halted.

The Lincoln administration

attributed their suspension of the cartel to several factors: the South’s refusal
7
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On July 12, 1862 Major Generals John A. Dix (U.S) and Daniel Harvey Hill
(C.S.), acting under orders from George Brinton McClellan and Robert E. Lee
respectively, met to discuss articles for a cartel or exchange agreement.
Despite having been notified by President Lincoln six days earlier to avoid any
formal type of verbal recognition to the Confederacy (Lincoln still arguing his
case of a municipal war) in the provisions, Dix was given plenary power to draw
up provisions. The Dix-Hill agreement was based upon the cartel of 1813 drawn up
between the United States and Great Britain. It was ratified four days later on
July 22, 1862. See O.R., Ser. 2, Vol. 4, 210, 239, 266-68; for effect of
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to validate its parole and exchange of the Port Hudson and Vicksburg prisoners;
the desire of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and General Ulysses S. Grant to curb
desertion and bounty jumping by federal soldiers; and most importantly, Grant’s
belief that the most expeditious way to relieve all inhumane suffering and
treatment was to end the war.

The northern policy change, then, was in keeping

with Grant’s desires to end the war, one he called “a military necessity.” 10
Secretary Stanton utilized the stoppage of the exchange, moreover, to
inaugurate a renewed prison literature campaign on the national level to help
deflect growing criticism from Washington onto Richmond.

Stanton wanted to

convince northerners, and the rest of the world, that the southern confederacy
had erected and maintained a “deliberate system of savage and barbarous treatment
and starvation”

11

of northern prisoners.

He prodded the U.S. House Committee on

the Conduct and Expenditures of the War as well as aid societies like the United
States Sanitary Commission and Christian Commissions to make public their
interviews with former prisoners, audits of camps, and abstracts of their
official reports and findings. 12
By the early summer of 1864, the U.S. House committee finished its
investigation of ex-prisoners from an Annapolis hospital and made its official
report.

The report, containing thirty pages and eight photographs, summarized

the testimony of prisoners held in Richmond’s Libby Prison and on nearby Belle
Isle on the James River in Virginia.
north among the various presses.

It was quickly distributed throughout the

The House committee said that the “evidence

proves, beyond all matter of doubt . . . that the inhumane practices . . . are
the result of the determination on the part of the rebel authorities to reduce
our soldiers in their power, by privation of food and clothing, and by
exposure.” 13

Secretary of War Stanton added fuel to the report when he said, “The

published accounts and cartel agreement see New York Times, July 13, 24, 1862;
for periods of confinement see Speer Portals to Hell, xiv
10
O.R., Ser. II, Vol. VII, 605-607; John Y. Simon, Ed., The Papers of Ulysses S.
Grant, 24 Vols. (Carbondale, Illinois, 1967-1988), Vol. XIII, 158, 180, 323.
11
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12
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13
Report No. 67, 2-4.
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enormity of the crime committed by the rebels towards our prisoners for the last
several months is not known or realized by our people . . . [as there] appears to
have been a deliberate system of savage and barbarous treatment and starvation.” 14
Thus heading into the fall elections of 1864, Stanton’s incendiary rhetoric,
combined with the report of the House Committee on the Conduct and Expenditures
of the War, served as the spark that helped inflame the northern populous behind
the Union war effort and President Lincoln’s reelection bid.

Northerners seemed

to accept that the war must continue, and thus bolstered the decidedly Republican
policy objectives.
In a continued effort to make northern audiences believe that southerners
were brutes, the United States Sanitary Commission also investigated the
conditions of prisoners who had been held by the Confederacy in Richmond’s Libby
and Belle Isle prisons.

The Sanitary Commission corroborated the U.S. House

report by claiming that they too witnessed “diseased and dying [men] . . . [that
were] physically ruined for life.” 15

The Sanitation Commission concluded its

findings with the veiled charge that much suffering might have been alleviated by
Confederate authorities despite shortages of supplies in the Confederacy’s
capital.

The “dreadful condition of things,” it continued, “might be

attributable to even other causes than the possible destitution of the rebel
government.” 16

By “other causes,” the commission was referring to the South’s

alleged “spirit of cruelty, inhumanity, and interested malice.” 17
Following Lincoln’s reelection and the reports of the U.S. House on the
Conduct of the War and U.S. Sanitary Commission, the South had heard and remained
silent long enough.
allegations.

On March 3, 1865 the Confederate Congress responded to the

In a report issued by a joint committee of Confederate senators and

representatives, the South, bridling at the North’s hypocrisy regarding prison
camps, stated their disdain for the recent publications circulating throughout

14
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the North as well as the mainland of Europe.

It read, “This report is rendered

especially important by reason of persistent efforts lately made by the
Government of the United States, and by associations and individuals connected or
co-operating with it, to asperse the honor of the Confederate authorities and to
charge them with deliberate and willful cruelty to prisoners of war.” 18
The Confederate joint committee’s report countered the charges laid against
them by the U.S. House and Sanitary Commission by leveling charges of their own.
The southern joint committee claimed that northern prisoners “were not in a worse
state than were the Confederate prisoners [who] returned from northern hospitals
and prisons.”

Moreover, and more importantly, they berated the North for the

deplorable state of its prison camps given the abundance of supplies throughout
the federal army and the northern nation at large.

The joint committee, with a

measure of sarcasm and irritation, added that “the humanity and superior
management [which have been] subjects of special boasting by the U.S. Sanitation”
were completely false and never applied to southern prisoners while captive in
the north. 19
The Confederate joint committee also conducted several interviews with its
soldiers and surgeons who had been held captive in the north.

One account, given

by an assistant surgeon, stated that, “I have seen many of our prisoners returned
from the North who were nothing but skin and bones.”
have never seen such a set of men in worse condition.
emaciated that we lifted them like little children.
living skeletons.” 20

They were so enfeebled and
Many of them were like

The report went on refute and counter, point by point, the

statements made by the U.S. House Committee’s report.
18

Another surgeon added, “I

Moreover, the Confederate

R.A. Brock, Ed., The Southern Historical Society Papers, 52 Vols., 1876-1959
(Millwood, New York, 1977), Vol. 1, No. 3, 113-114, 132-153, (hereinafter cited
as SHSP); O.R., Ser. II, Vol. VIII, 338. It should be noted that two of the eight
photos included in the original reports issued by the U.S. House and Sanitary
Commission’s reports were of men who died before the Sanitary Committee visited
Annapolis, and a third photo was of a soldier who was from a military field
hospital thus lending credence to the South’s frustrated response and subsequent
cry of northern disingenuousness. For a full explanation see Hesseltine, Civil
War Prisons, 69-113.
19
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341.
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representatives sought to depict the United States Sanitation Commission as a
mere instrument of propaganda for the Lincoln administration. 21
When the war concluded in 1865, Northern and Southern ex-prisoners began to
compile a list of complaints relative to their treatment while held in captivity.
Veterans who had successfully passed through the valley of the enemy’s shadow
complained about theft, compatriots being shot, poorly equipped and staffed
hospitals, inadequate or nonexistent medical supplies, a lack of shelter and poor
sanitation, inconsistent supply and quality of foodstuffs, cruelty and harshness
of prison guards, and most widely documented, the stoppage of the exchange.
Postbellum polemicists, therefore, had a plethora of complaints, relative to the
mistreatment of prisoners, with which to wave the bloody shirt and to advance
their public and at times private agendas. 22
From 1865 to the outset of American involvement in World War One, veterans
and politicians utilized the prisoner-of-war system to support disability claims
on their applications for pension, and to psychologically assuage their mental
debilitation through the writing of papers and pamphlets.

Though some veterans’

accounts of prison life and psychological anguish were truly reflective of the
conditions within the camps, as substantiated by northern and southern veteran’s

20
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accounts, many reflections often embellished and perverted the reality of their
imprisonment and the prison system as a whole.

What is important to remember is

that many believed that their condition had been part of a deliberate scheme by a
barbarous enemy to reduce their ranks, rather than a mere oversight or
consequence of war.

The reality of the prison system and poor conditions within

the camps, however, was that both sides lacked a standardized system of
administration.

Because of the lack of standardization, the experiences and

conditions faced by individual prisoners varied with the geographic location of
the camp, composition of the guards, and overall management. 23
The lack of standardization was further hindered in both the North and the
South because of disagreement between the central and state governments.

In

early 1862 because some state prison camps, like Camp Chase near Columbus, Ohio,
were both poorly managed and geographically placed, the Lincoln administration
decided to provide for a formalized development of the prison camp system. 24
On October 26, 1861 Colonel William H. Hoffman, a parolee from the United
States Eighth Infantry in Texas, was appointed commissary-general of prisoners.
Hoffman, a former prisoner and man with considerable legal experience,
immediately began to implement a detailed plan of centralization.

All

correspondence regarding the prison system was required to pass through his
office.

23

Moreover, as directed by the War Department in Washington, he was to

For a good account of the psychological effects—and the roller coaster ride of
emotion regarding exchange—within the camps, see Joe Barbiere, Scraps from the
Prison Table, 100-106, 125-131. David E. Chesebrough, God Ordained This War:
Sermons on the Sectional Crisis, 1830-1865 (Columbia, South Carolina, 1991), 127129. The North began to replace camp guards with paroled soldiers who thought,
upon their surrender, that they would be sent home rather than to finish out
their enlistments. The South, with a dwindling number of fighting men, began to
replace their camp guards with older men and young boys whose age and temperament
were anything but civil and stable. As a result, northern and southern prisoners
were exposed to greater physical and psychological anguish because of the change.
24
As early as August 1861, General M.C. Meigs, quartermaster-general of the
army, instructed then Secretary of the War Simon Cameron that a commissarygeneral of prisoners would be required. Meigs made his decision both because of
the growing number of Confederate seaman (Lincoln referred them to as pirates
because of the debate of de facto recognition) that had been captured, and most
importantly, Union defeat at (First) Manassas meant the war may well last much
longer than the preconceived ninety days.
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establish rules for camp commandants--in accordance with international law--and
to call for the development of a system of audits and inspections. 25
In the autumn of 1861, the Union supported several prisons that had been
erected haphazardly with regard to provincial departmental need and in absence of
a centralized governing body (largely because of the aforementioned position of
Lincoln’s administration regarding the de facto recognition of the Confederacy).
From the concrete citadel of Fort Warren in Boston Harbor, Massachusetts to a
confiscated medical college in St. Louis, Missouri, the Union held Confederate
“insurgents” in poorly constructed and inadequately guarded prison camps.
Hoffman, the prisons presented a clear security risk.

For

26

In order to reduce the feasibility of escape because of poor geographic
location and to limit the possibility of cavalry raids whose purpose may also be
to aid escape, Hoffman, with the support of the quartermaster-general of the army
General M. C. Meigs, decided to build a new military prison camp well within the
Union’s interior.

They looked to the shores of Lake Erie near Sandusky and

Norwalk, Ohio, and singled out the islands of Put-in-Bay.

Following inspection

of the islands, Hoffman reported that Johnson’s Island afforded the most suitable
site.

The island, located well over a mile out in the bay, was easily accessible

and maintainable from a sizable railhead located in nearby Sandusky. 27
Following the U.S. War Department’s review of the report, Hoffman received
authorization to go ahead with the construction of the prison on Johnson’s
Island.

Under orders and in accordance to Hoffman’s direction, the camp would

house approximately a thousand prisoners at a time, and was to be constructed as
parsimoniously as possible.

Hoffman’s governance and capital spending regarding

construction, as well as the prison camp system at large, therefore, would follow
the same logic of cost considerations over comfort levels. 28

25
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In February 1862, the prison camp on Johnson’s Island was completed.

The

question of control, however, met with varying degrees of friction from the
governor of Ohio, Richard Tod.

Although aware that the fort at Johnson’s Island

had been fully funded from federal coffers, Governor Tod insisted that he be
allowed to appoint Ohio volunteers as guards and to establish regulations for
governance of the camp.
dismay.

Hoffman responded to Tod’s request with disgust and

With respect to his centralized plan, he argued that because prisoners

were to be sent to pre-determined camps according to their appropriate rank, 29
that any deviation from the newly established standard of regulations and control
would lead to potential problems of mismanagement or adjustment of newly
transferred prisoners--new prisoners like the thousands recently captured after
the fall of Fort Donelson. 30
Hoffman specifically used Camp Chase, under Tod’s and the State of Ohio’s
supervision, as an example of mismanagement and as a way to publicly spar with
and humiliate Governor Tod’s administration in Columbus.

The Confederate

officers that were held at Camp Chase were free to leave the prison compound and
to go into the town of Columbus each day as long as they gave their word as
gentlemen that they would return within a twenty-four hour period.

Captured

Confederate officers, then, could readily be seen “suffering” in Columbus’ finest
hotels and brothels, many accompanied by their slaves.

The complete lack of

control displayed at Camp Chase, along with the continued complaints from the
citizens of Columbus, helped to bring about total Federal control of all
prisoners within the state (and the several states).

Thus for the Confederate

officers at Camp Chase, the party, quite literally, was over. 31
While the Union struggled to establish a unified and coherent prison camp
policy, the South also met with difficulties in its development of a system.

29

On

Officers were to be separated from enlisted men.
O.R., Ser. II, Vol. III 427. The surrender of Fort Donelson thrust
approximately twelve thousand Confederate troops into a nascent prison system
designed for far fewer prisoners, and thus added to the problems Hoffman faced in
gaining centralized control. It is also the site that Grant earned his nom de
guerre “Unconditional Surrender” Grant.
31
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315.
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May 21, 1861, the Confederate Congress ratified an act regarding treatment of
prisoners-of-war.

Confederate President Jefferson Davis’ administration, unlike

it counterpart, pushed for the rapid development of an effective prison camp
system to further bolster its desire for international recognition, de facto, de
jure, or otherwise. 32
Less than a month later in June, 1861 and with a continued proactive view
toward the development of the prison camp system, Confederate Secretary of War
Leroy Walker approached the North Carolina’s governor’s office with the request
of securing a new prison site. 33

Walker, under pressure from the people of

Richmond who clamored for the removal of “Yankee” prisoners, was relieved when he
was notified that North Carolina would be willing to recommend a suitable site
once located.

North Carolina authorities quickly presented Salisbury.

Located

in the southwestern corner of North Carolina and presumably well into the
Confederacy’s interior, Salisbury served as major railroad hub for points “north,
south, and west” for ease of transportation. 34
The recommendation of Salisbury, however, came at a price.

Henry Toole

Clarke, serving as Governor ex oficio following the passing of Governor John
Willis Ellis, insisted that North Carolina be allowed to “furnish proper troops
for guard purposes.”

Moreover, and rather surreptitiously, Clarke recommended

that the purchase of a cotton factory in Salisbury, which could house nearly two
thousand prisoners, “be withheld from the public until after the purchase.”
Moreover, Clarke went on to imply that the factory could be sold for at least
double its purchase price “when the war is over.” 35
Walker was upset by the arrogant tone of Clarke’s letter, his materialminded rhetoric, and his insinuation that only troops from North Carolina were
capable of guarding the camp.

Over the subsequent months, Walker would spar with

Clarke over various legal matters including unapproved prisoner exchanges.
Because North Carolina pursued the exchanges, Walker reasoned, the state’s
32
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actions sought to undermine the Confederate government’s central control and thus
left open the door for confusion and mismanagement.

Upon receiving news that

Confederate bonds could be sold to cover the cost of construction and with the
influx of prisoners following the Confederate victory at the First Battle of
Manassas, however, Walker softened.

He had little choice but to concede to

Clarke’s wishes.
Jefferson Davis too found himself embroiled in debate with Virginia’s
Governor John Letcher.

Letcher maintained that captured Union officers should be

surrendered to his commonwealth for trial.
for inciting slave insurrection.

They were to be tried, he believed,

Davis, like the rest of the country, well

understood from the trial of John Brown what a guilty verdict in Virginia would
most probably bring for Northern officers--death by hanging--and thus worked to
neutralize Letcher’s position for obvious diplomatic purposes.

Despite the

resolution of Letcher’s demands, however, Davis would ultimately win the debate.
In March 1863 outright control of prisoners was turned over to the central
authorities in Richmond.
The disagreements, even if largely rhetorical, would be but a few examples
of the several well-documented battles between Davis’ administration and the
various state governors like Francis Pickens, Zebulon Vance, Joseph Brown, and
John Letcher.

They were, in the end, debates that delayed action and that

ultimately impacted the collective memories of those officers and soldiers who
were kept in a constant state of flux. 36
Surprisingly, and counter to much of the postwar pejorative prose, some
veterans, like those Confederate officers imprisoned at Camp Chase, portrayed the
prison experience in a different light.
North Carolinian in 1864.

“It is very pleasant today,” wrote one

“We had pical [pickle] Pork for breakfast this morning

and for dinner we had Been [bean] Soop.” 37

Other accounts, though not nearly as

numerous as those describing the darker side of camp life, suggested that
prisoners were afforded access to goods sold by sutlers and that meals were
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provided by local citizens.

Colonel William Ward of the 9th Tennessee Cavalry

reported that he was able to purchase “two different calico shirts at $2 each” 38
while imprisoned in Alton, Illinois.

A Chaplain White from the Rhode Island

Heavy Artillery held in North Carolina said, “We went with a guard to a house
nearby, and which was evidently the property of a well-to-do family.
treated us kindly.

They

They were rebels, and no mistake.” 39

Despite a fairly large body of positive rhetoric regarding the treatment of
soldiers, 40 which seems to suggest that prison perception was truly a case by case
experience, the politicians paid them little lip service following the war.
Preachers too played on the extraordinary circumstances of the system and spoke
to the sensational rather than the real.

Additionally, the press refused to

circulate them as widely as their “darker” counterparts.

Instead, the

politicians, the press, and at times the preachers, chose to revisit the
atrocities of the prison camps at the hands of a “barbarous murderer” in an
effort to revitalize sectional animosity and to increase political capital as
well as rates of subscription.

In short, the dark side sold. 41

While being subjected to the postwar rhetoric of imprisonment, northern and
southern citizens attempted to reconcile the more widely circulated accounts of
demoralization, demise, and death within the context of their individually
professed Christian principles like forgiveness.

The assassination of President

Lincoln, however, hardened the hearts of northerners more fully.

With Lincoln’s

assassination, they were less willing to turn the other cheek toward the southern
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populace.

The tragedy played out at Ford’s Theater only seemed to confirm the

denunciatory sentiment of the northern prisoners, politicians, and polemicists. 42
From the first published accounts in 1862 and through the 1880s, veterans
regularly contributed their battle and prison memories to magazines and
newspapers thus increasing circulations.

The accounts, however, often played to

the sensational and, at times, mirrored the ever-popular dime novels.

Preachers

too exacerbated the festering animosity between sections shortly after the war.
In one postbellum sermon, a northern preacher excoriated Confederate authorities
when he said, “We see the unmitigated turpitude [of the South].. . . It is the
same spirit . . . that starved our unhappy prisoners at Andersonville—that
butchered our men in cold blood at Fort Pillow—that froze our veterans to death
on Belle Island [Isle] . . . [and] that crowded our officers in the damp dungeons
of Richmond.” 43

The partisan nature of some publishers and preachers, therefore,

fanned the embers within the political chambers that, in turn, weld together
northern sentiment against a common enemy, the South. 44
In 1869, the political inferno fully engulfed both sections of the country
following the release of House Report No. 45.

The published report was the

byproduct of a committee appointed by the U.S. House of Representatives to
investigate the treatment of prisoners of war.

After interviewing over three

thousand former prisoners, the committee concluded that the treatment had been
the result of “slavery, treason, and rebellion.”

Moreover the report recorded

that the alleged abominable treatment of Union prisoners provided a perverse
example “to which the eyes of future generations revert with shame.” 45
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Confederate veterans and leaders responded to Report No. 45 as they had to
all previous reports from House committees and “federally-backed” commissions
like the United States Sanitation and Christian Commissions.
States policy and its decision-makers.

They blamed United

Southern leaders never denied the charge

that Union soldiers suffered in their prison camps.

What they did contest,

however, were the allegations of intentional mistreatment and, most importantly,
that the South was solely to blame for all the prisoners’ privations.

Jefferson

Davis blamed the Lincoln administration’s decision to end the exchange as it had
been “one of the established usages in war between civilized nations.” 46

Further,

he argued that the withholding of medicines as contraband of war prevented
supplies from reaching hospitals inside southern prison camps thus increasing the
number of Union casualties.

For Davis, the root cause of all of the humanitarian

misfortune was the end of the exchange. 47
Davis’ argument regarding the misrepresentation of intentional mistreatment
by the South found support in the U.S. War Department records concerning the
number of prisoners and deaths within the prison camps.

During the war the

Confederacy held 270,000 Union prisoners of which 22,000 lost their lives.
Conversely the North held 220,000 Confederate prisoners of which 26,000 perished.
For Davis and Confederate veterans, the U.S. War Department numbers painted a
horrific picture of reality; the reality that more Confederate soldiers died in
Union camps even though “in every material respect . . . the North held greatly
the advantage.” 48
In 1878, the inflammatory sectional rhetoric regarding prison camps reached
its pinnacle.

A debate in the House of Representatives over the pending Amnesty

Bill sounded the assembly call for both political parties and once again stirred
the smoldering ashes of animosity between sections of the country.
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Bill offered the restoration of unlimited political rights to all who had
previously held public office in the United States, but had given service to the
Confederacy during the war.

The debate began when presidential hopeful James G.

Blaine of Maine sought to amend the bill by specifically excluding Jefferson
Davis.

Blaine argued for exclusion on the grounds that the former Confederate

commander-in-chief “was the author [who] knowingly, deliberately, guiltily, and
willfully . . . [orchestrated] the gigantic murders and crimes at Andersonville
[prison].” 49

Moreover, Blaine repeated the northern claim in Report No. 45 that

Confederate prisoners had been treated fairly, and that all acts of atrocities
had occurred south of the Mason-Dixon Line. 50
In response to Blaine’s assault on Davis and the South at large,
Representative Benjamin Hill of Georgia voiced his dismay at the purely political
rhetoric of Blaine and some Republicans, “We had well hoped that the country had
suffered long enough from feuds . . . [and] from inflamed passions . . . [only to
see] the passions from which all were hushing shall be re-inflamed.” 51

Benjamin

Hill, like Davis and southern veterans had often repeated before him, argued that
northern policy was responsible for the suffering.

“Every horror,” Hill

declared, “grew out of the necessities of occasion.”

Moreover, those

“necessities were cast upon the confederacy by the war policy of the other
side.” 52
Hill’s rebuttal, however, showed that the deep sectional wounds caused by
the war were healing.

He refused to place blame, as some southerners had in the

past, on any one individual, committee, or commission.

Rather, in comparing the

death tolls, northern and southern, as reported by the U.S. War Department, he
stated that the “horrors are inseparable, many of them and most of them resulting
from a state of war.” Hill well understood Blaine’s personal presidential
aspirations and thus his desire to drive a wedge between northern and southern
Democrats in an attempt to regain Republican control of the House.
49
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gentleman from Maine has so ostentatiously paraded, for obvious partisan purpose
of exciting upon this floor a bitter sectional discussion, from which his party,
and perhaps himself, may be the beneficiary.” 53
Hill’s oration, while detailed, reasoned, and strong, could do little to
save the Democratic-sponsored Amnesty Bill.

The measure would fail.

Yet even

though the measure failed and the Hill-Blaine debate served to prolong the
generation-long argument over mistreatment of prisoners-of-war, Hill’s refusal to
point a sectional finger at any one entity showed that the disagreement had
evolved to one that once again transcended sectional lines to the more
traditional political party lines.

The hands of time, therefore, had begun to

heal the wounds of war. 54
In the end, postbellum remembrance of the American Civil War prison system,
much like the memories of those who were held within the camps, varied from
inmate to inmate.

Because each individual’s perception of the system differed,

the prisoners’ collective memory formed a patchwork of partisan perception; a
series of still-frame photographs that formed an irrational and illogical collage
open to interpretation, and at times, manipulation.

Regardless of experience or

perception, however, most recollections were driven by a desire for some degree
of indemnification--whether psychological, political, or financial--for having
been subjected and sacrificed to the machinations of wartime policy and postwar
politics.
While the purpose of this paper has been to build a bridge in the gap of the
present American Civil War prisoner-or-war system historiography by focusing on
an institutional perspective to the problem, it clearly remains a cursory study
at best.

Further elucidation awaits the innovation and erudition of some future

author who can provide a more complete, detailed account; further work that also
suggests that the study of the American Civil War remains very much alive.
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